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: /lib/python3/dist-packages/oauthlib/oauth1/rfc5849/endpoints/ [ drwxr-xr-x ]
name : signature_only.py # -*- coding: utf-8 -*- """ oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849.endpoints.signature_only ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This module is an implementation of the signing logic of OAuth 1.0 RFC 5849. """ from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals import logging from .. import errors from .base import BaseEndpoint log = logging.getLogger(__name__) class SignatureOnlyEndpoint(BaseEndpoint): """An endpoint only responsible for verifying an oauth signature.""" def validate_request(self, uri, http_method='GET', body=None, headers=None): """Validate a signed OAuth request. :param uri: The full URI of the token request. :param http_method: A valid HTTP verb, i.e. GET, POST, PUT, HEAD, etc. :param body: The request body as a string. :param headers: The request headers as a dict. :returns: A tuple of 2 elements. 1. True if valid, False otherwise. 2. An oauthlib.common.Request object. """ try: request = self._create_request(uri, http_method, body, headers) except errors.OAuth1Error as err: log.info( 'Exception caught while validating request, %s.' % err) return False, None try: self._check_transport_security(request) self._check_mandatory_parameters(request) except errors.OAuth1Error as err: log.info( 'Exception caught while validating request, %s.' % err) return False, request if not self.request_validator.validate_timestamp_and_nonce( request.client_key, request.timestamp, request.nonce, request): log.debug('[Failure] verification failed: timestamp/nonce') return False, request # The server SHOULD return a 401 (Unauthorized) status code when # receiving a request with invalid client credentials. # Note: This is postponed in order to avoid timing attacks, instead # a dummy client is assigned and used to maintain near constant # time request verification. # # Note that early exit would enable client enumeration valid_client = self.request_validator.validate_client_key( request.client_key, request) if not valid_client: request.client_key = self.request_validator.dummy_client valid_signature = self._check_signature(request) # log the results to the validator_log # this lets us handle internal reporting and analysis request.validator_log['client'] = valid_client request.validator_log['signature'] = valid_signature # We delay checking validity until the very end, using dummy values for # calculations and fetching secrets/keys to ensure the flow of every # request remains almost identical regardless of whether valid values # have been supplied. This ensures near constant time execution and # prevents malicious users from guessing sensitive information v = all((valid_client, valid_signature)) if not v: log.info("[Failure] request verification failed.") log.info("Valid client: %s", valid_client) log.info("Valid signature: %s", valid_signature) return v, request